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EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY: WHAT CAN BE GAINED BY
COMBINING COASE AND RAWLS?
Russell B. Korobkin*
Thomas S. Ulen* *
For decades, one of the most constant criticisms of the economic
analysis of law has been that it fails to address distributive justice
concerns. The critics say that this failure, in combination with the
seemingly single-minded commitment of law and economics to
efficiency as a (or the) legal norm, places law and economics well
outside the law's long-standing and deep commitment to justice.
Moreover, according to the critics, the field is out of step with society at
large, which, through both norms and laws, seems far more committed to
fairness and equity than to efficiency.
Heretofore, law and economics scholars have sought to address these
criticisms by alleging that efficiency is and long has been a (or even the)
dominant concern of the common law;' that equity is not a coherent
concept or one upon which there is, in any given instance, widespread
agreement;2 that law and economics' concentration on efficiency is
dictated by underlying microeconomic theory and not by an evaluation
that efficiency is necessarily a superior value to equity;3 and that, in
* Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law and University of Illinois Institute of
Government and Public Affairs.
* *Alumni Distinguished Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, and Professor,
University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs. The authors thank Ian Ayres,
Cheryl Hanna, and Saikrishna Prakash for their insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 27-29, 271-75 (5th ed. 1998). The
suggestion that the common law process gives rise to efficient legal rules was developed in John C.
Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. Legal Stud. 393 (1978),
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65
(1977), and Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977). That
suggestion is criticized in Robert D. Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 8 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1980), and Gillian K Hadfield, Bias in the
Evolution ofLegal Rules, 80 Geo. L.J. 583 (1992).
2. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1984). That article was criticized in Laurence Tribe, Constitutional
Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 592 (1985). Easterbrook replied
in Frank H. Easterbrook, Method, Result, andAuthority: A Reply, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1985).
3. See Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, Law andEconomics 104-06 (2d ed. 1997).
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reality, little difference exists between efficiency and traditional, justice-
based analyses of legal rules and institutions.4
Professors Swygert and Yanes take a different tack.5 They seek to
bring efficiency and equity to bear explicitly on the economic analysis of
law by merging Rawlsean social contract philosophy into law and
economics' basic premise, the Coase Theorem. We are in complete
agreement with Swygert and Yanes that good legal policy should be
concerned with both efficiency and equity, and we welcome their attempt
to merge the two as a useful step in an important debate. Ultimately,
though, we are unconvinced by their argument as it currently stands for
two reasons. First, by focusing only on the way in which their approach
might affect how the law regulates the exchange of goods or legal
entitlements (i.e., contract law), the authors provide no explanation of
how their approach could be used to determine the initial allocation of
goods and legal entitlements (i.e., property law). If legal policy is to take
equity as seriously as efficiency, it is critical that equity be considered
when legal entitlements are assigned, not merely when parties choose to
trade their entitlements. Consequently, the omission of any discussion of
how entitlements might be initially assigned under the authors' proposed
theoretical framework is of critical importance.
Second, the authors' argument for jointly considering equity and
efficiency when legal rules are developed is severely flawed. It rests on
an unrealistic empirical premise-that all classes of entitlement
4. This is the thrust of much of the conventional law and economics of property, contract, and tort
law. For example, one might well argue that it is efficient to compensate property owners when the
government physically takes their property because that rule generally induces both private parties
and the government to make efficient land-use decisions. But one could just as easily argue that the
compensation requirement does justice to the private property owner. On the economic analysis of
taking and regulatory taking, see Cooter & Ulen, supra note 3, at 149-55. On the general
comparison between efficiency and fairness analyses of law, see Posner, supra note 1, at 30-31. See
also Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980); Debate: Is Law and
Economics Moral?, 24 Valparaiso L. Rev. 147 (1990). There are, of course, instances in which
efficiency and traditional analyses of legal rules reach different conclusions. For instance, one of us
has argued that the efficiency of contracting and of the resolution of contractual disputes would be
more efficient if specific performance were the routine remedy for breach of contract. Thomas S.
Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Perormance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83
Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984). Neither all or even most law and economics scholars agree with that
position. The traditional view is, of course, that money damages should be the routine remedy for
contract breach. Importantly, where this and other differences between efficiency and equity exist,
very few followers of law and economics categorically assert that the efficiency analysis should
prevail.
5. Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of
Fairness into Efficiency, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 249 (1998).
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claimants are equally wealthy, on average-and it fails to take account of
the negative efficiency consequences that are likely to follow from the
operationalization of their approach. Because of such negative
consequences, a legal regime ultimately concerned with efficiency and
equity might be better off with rules of private law that focus entirely on
providing incentives for individuals to maximize the efficient use of
resources followed by a tax-and-transfer system to redistribute goods and
entitlements equitably ex post. Most legal economists implicitly or
explicitly prefer such a "two-step" approach to efficiency and equity over
any "single-step" approach.6 While conventional wisdom does not
always equate with foolproof reasoning, Swygert and Yanes must, at a
minimum, provide a reason for preferring that equity be provided
concurrently with, rather than subsequent to, efficiency.
In this response to Swygert and Yanes, we undertake three principal
tasks. First, we attempt to highlight the insights in the authors' argument
that are novel and important to the debate on allocating entitlements and
policing their transfer. Second, we attempt to expand their analysis by
developing a theory of how property rights could be allocated consistent
with Swygert and Yanes's dual focus on efficiency and equity. We call
our theory the "market contrarian" approach to entitlement allocation.
Third, we address the negative consequences of combining the goals of
efficiency and equity in the creation of rules of property and contract law
and explain why the traditional "two-step" approach favored by law and
economics scholars might be superior. Here we rely on the Second
Theorem of Welfare Economics.7 Finally, we offer concluding remarks
on the future of equitable considerations in law and economics.
I. INTEGRATING EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
The Coase Theorem stands for the proposition that wheri transaction
costs (the costs of affecting an exchange) are zero, bargaining will result
6. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on
Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter
Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414 (1981).
7. The Second Theorem-or the Second Fundamental Theorem-of Welfare Economics, which
we discuss more fully below in Part HILA, holds that, in competitive markets, efficiency and equity
are separable. The implication is that society need not use a single policy instrument to achieve its
efficiency and distributive goals. Rather, separate policy instruments can independently seek to
achieve societal goals with respect to the efficient allocation of resources and the equitable
distribution of income and wealth.
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in an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the assignment of
legal rights and obligations! Costless bargaining should allow the parties
to whom a right or obligation is most valuable to purchase it (if they do
not have it initially) or retain it (if they already happen to have it). Thus,
the initial assignment of legal rights and obligations does not matter to
the efficient use of resources.9 The assignment of rights does, however,
affect wealth and income positions. The person to whom the initial
assignment is made will be wealthier than if he did not initially have the
right, either because he can enjoy it without having to first purchase it or
because he can sell it and use the proceeds to acquire other entitlements
that he would prefer.'0
Swygert and Yanes focus their attention on the failure of the Coase
Theorem to take account of equity in its implicit suggestions for
establishing legal rules to govern private contracting in situations where
one individual values a good or a legal entitlement more than its original
owner." The authors would address this inattention by incorporating the
notion of the Rawlsean veil of ignorance (what Swygert and Yanes call
the "condition of hidden identity") into the circumstances in which the
Coase Theorem is relevant-at least in contract law."2 To accomplish this
modification, they suggest asking bargaining parties what legal rules they
would prefer to govern private contracts if they did not know on which
side of the potential bargain they would, in fact, stand.3
In what way would this approach lead to different legal rules than
those that emanate from traditional law and economics scholarship?
8. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 6 (1960).
9. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 3, at 79-93 (discussing Coase Theorem).
10. Professor Coase contends that the initial assignment does not affect income and wealth
positions when transaction costs are zero because each party will have discounted the value of
holding the entitlement to reflect the likelihood of exchanges and other future changes. See Ronald
Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 170-74 (1988).
11. The offending inattention to equity arises only in bargains having to do with fundamental
legal rights and obligations. By this friendly amendment to Professors Swygert and Yanes' proposal,
we mean to suggest that no one cares deeply about the division of a cooperative surplus between a
green-grocer and a purchaser of onions, but they do care about the meta-rules of surplus division in
contractual relations, real property transactions, bargains for the potential waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights, employer-employee relationships, and similar situations.
12. We assume that there is no dispute between Professors Swygert and Yanes and law and
economics scholars about the appropriate circumstances in which to apply the Coase Theorem. That
is, we all seem to agree that the Coase Theorem is to be used, if at all, in settings of zero transaction
costs.
13. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 5, at 314-16.
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Given an initial allocation of entitlements and zero transaction costs, the
Coase Theorem favors the enforcement of any voluntary exchange. The
problem with such a regime, according to Swygert and Yanes, is that
when one party to a transaction is stronger (i.e., has market power), she
can co-opt "almost all of the surplus utility created by the transaction,"
even when the transaction is wealth-maximizing and both parties are
benefited by it. 4 According to the authors, the appropriate response to
such efficient but inequitable transfers is to use legal rules to force the
parties to divide the gains in trades created by such bargains equally.
The doctrine of unconscionability is perhaps the most understandable
example offered by Swygert and Yanes of how to operationalize this
principle. In the standard casebook example of the doctrine, Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,' 5 a retail store imposed a cross-
collateralization payment clause in a consumer credit contract that gave
the store the right to repossess all items purchased on credit by a
customer if the customer missed a payment prior to paying off its balance
on each one of the items. 6 The court found the contract potentially
"unconscionable" and therefore not enforceable. 7 Swygert and Yanes
call this conclusion defensible "under a pure fairness approach"
(although they do not elaborate on-and it is not obvious-why this is
the case).' They suggest that the case should be decided by asking what
resolution the parties would favor if they understood the facts of the case
but did not know whether they were the consumer or the merchant. 9
With the qualification that their opinion is tentative, the authors suggest
that the transaction should be permitted but the terms most onerous to the
consumer disallowed.20
It is not at all clear to us why Swygert and Yanes believe that parties
to the transaction, without knowing which party they are, would favor
such a resolution. But we believe the following arguments lead to their
conclusion. First, individuals experience a declining marginal utility for
money; that is, they gain more pleasure from their first dollar than from
14. Id. at 14.
15. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see Cooter & Ulen, supra note 3, at 253-55 (discussing
Williams).
16. Williams, 350 F.2d at447.
17. Id. at 450.
18. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 5, at 317-19.
19. Id. at319.
20. Id.
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their second dollar, from their second dollar than their third, and so on.
Second, because of the declining marginal utility for money,2' people
tend to be risk averse in financial matters; that is, they would prefer a
certainty of one dollar to a fifty percent chance of gaining two dollars
coupled with a fifty percent chance of gaining zero dollars, even though
both choices have the same expected value of one dollar. Third, without
knowing whether they are the buyer or the seller in a given transaction,
risk-averse individuals would prefer an approximately fifty percent share
of the cooperative surplus created by the transaction rather than a fifty
percent chance of gaining virtually all the surplus (if they turn out to be
the retailer with the strong bargaining position) and a fifty percent
chance of gaining virtually none of the surplus (if they turn out to be the
consumer with little bargaining power). Finally, the authors' proposed
resolution of the case assigns-in a rough kind of way-approximately
half of the cooperative surplus to each party.
This analysis suggests a few observations about Swygert and Yanes's
approach that go unstated by the authors. First, although Swygert and
Yanes consistently refer to a "fairness" norm, their approach is rooted in
utilitarianism. That is, they ultimately seek to justify their
redistributionist approach to contract law by implicitly claiming that it
would maximize the joint utility of the parties to a transaction, viewed
from the ex ante position. Second, the key insight that drives their
conclusions is that individuals are risk averse. Their policy
recommendations, it turns out, do not depend directly on the Coase
Theorem or the Rawlsean veil of ignorance, but on the far simpler claim
that equally distributing the gains to be captured by Pareto-efficient
transactions maximizes social utility.22 Third, for their analysis to be
correct, the authors must assume that all parties to Pareto-efficient
transactions are equally wealthy prior to the transaction, at least on
average. If consumers subject to cross-collateralization credit agreements
tend to be poorer on average than retailers that impose such terms, and
both consumers and retailers are subject to the declining marginal utility
of money, the law might maximize social utility by granting the lion's
share of any cooperative surplus to the consumers. To put the point into
21. That is, most individuals are risk averse. For a discussion of the connection between one's
marginal utility of income or wealth and one's attitudes toward risk, see Cooter & Ulen, supra note
3, at 44-48. See also Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of
Ignorance, 1998 U. 11. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
22. An exchange or reallocation is "Pareto efficient" if it makes no party worse off and at least
one of the parties better off. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 3, at 12.
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terms that Swygert and Yanes use, if the parties to such a transaction
knew the ex ante wealth distribution between consumers and retailers but
did not know which party they would be, risk aversion might well
suggest that they would favor a distribution of the surplus that favored
the poorer party. That it is almost certainly true that consumers and
retailers are not equally wealthy ex ante highlights an important failure
of Swygert and Yanes's theory, a point to which we return later.3
II. EXPANDING THE EQUITY/EFFICIENCY DUALISM TO
PROPERTY RULES: THE "MARKET CONTRARAW'
APPROACH
The premise that motivates Swygert and Yanes's argument is that the
rules of private law should take account of equity concerns in addition to
the efficiency concerns that drive most law and economics analysis. But
their analysis considers only how this concern should affect the policing
of private transactions given some exogenously determined baseline set
of entitlements. That is, their argument addresses only the rules of
contract law. 4 They ignore the question of how legal rules should
initially assign legal rights between competing claimants. Their
discussion of nuisance law, for example, completely ignores the question
of whether an activity should be considered a nuisance. Instead, the
analysis focuses only on the rules governing the exchange of an assumed
right of neighbors to a factory to be free from noxious pollution."
The authors' failure to consider how rules of property law would be
affected by a legal regime that took account of both equity and efficiency
is critical for a simple reason: the law has far more power to create
distributional equity through the allocation of initial entitlements than
through adjusting the terms of private transactions. Consequently, in this
section we present our own theory of how lawmakers could assign
property rights if they wish to combine efficiency and equity concerns in
their decisionmaking. We call this approach the "market contrarian"
approach to entitlement allocation. We explain both how entitlements
would be allocated and protected under the market contrarian approach
23. See extended discussion infra Part Ill.B.1.
24. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 5, at 317-23. Actually, their analysis concentrates on how
their approach would be operationalized in regard to a certain type of contract law rules:
"immutable" rules. The problems with applying the authors' approach to "default" contract law rules
is considered infra in Part 1m1.B.3.
25. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 5, at 324-25.
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and how this approach differs in important respects from Coase
Theorem-based approaches to entitlement allocation.
A. Allocating Entitlements Between Competing Claimants
As a point of departure for exploring the market contrarian approach,
consider a textbook example of a dispute over an entitlement (used by
Coase himself 6 and alluded to by Swygert and Yanes27): a factory that
emits noxious pollution and its unhappy neighbors. The operative legal
question is, "Which party or parties should have an entitlement to the
shared airspace?" If the law deems the factory a nuisance, then the law
effectively grants the entitlement to the neighbors, and they may either
enjoin the factory's production or sue for damages (depending on
whether the law protects the neighbors' entitlement by a "property" or
"liability" rule).2" If the law does not deem the factory a nuisance, then
the law implicitly grants the entitlement to the factory owner, and the
owner can pollute unless the neighbors pay a bribe sufficient to convince
the owner to stop production (or perhaps, to hypothesize a liability rule,
invoke condemnation proceedings at a court-approved price).29
Law and economics analysis, relying on the Coase Theorem, has
suggested two ways that lawmakers could attempt to efficiently allocate
the right in question, known as the "market mimicking" and "market
facilitating" approaches. 0 The former method calls on lawmakers to
determine whether the factory would continue to operate in a world of
zero transaction costs. If the answer is yes-or, in other words, if the
factory owner values pollution more than the neighbors value clean air-
then lawmakers should not deem the offending use a nuisance and should
allocate the entitlement to the factory owner. This outcome is efficient
26. Coase, supra note 8, at 41-42.
27. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 5, at 324-25.
28. For the seminal discussion that divides remedies into classes of "property rules" and "liability
rules," see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). The problem is cleverly
revisited in James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral
in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995). See also Symposium, Property Rules. Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 Yale L.J. 2081 (1997).
29. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (requiring polluter
to shut down its operation near residential neighborhood, but also requiring neighborhood's
developer to pay polluter's costs of relocation).
30. Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 123-24 (1987); see also Coase, supra note 8,
at 17-18.
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for one of two reasons. First, if transaction costs are low, the allocation
saves the parties from incurring transaction costs to reach this
assignment, which would have occurred if the law had initially assigned
the entitlement to the neighbors-who, by assumption, do not value the
entitlement as highly as does the factory-and they had then sold it to the
factory. Second, if transaction costs are high, the allocation to the factory
ensures efficiency because the higher-valuing user has the entitlement, an
outcome that might not have occurred if the law required the parties to
bargain. If lawmakers follow the market-mimicking approach without
error, it does not matter whether the entitlement holder's right is
protected with a property or a liability rule, because the non-entitlement
holder will not be willing to pay the entitlement holder's asking price or
a court-imposed condemnation price.
In contrast, the market-facilitating approach requires policymakers to
ask which possible allocation is likely to minimize transaction costs so
that the parties are most likely to bargain around the initial allocation if it
turns out to be inefficient. Those favoring this approach might be more
skeptical of lawmakers' abilities to determine ex ante which party most
values the entitlement than are those favoring the market-mimicking
approach. Consequently, the market-facilitating approach seeks to
minimize the social costs of the lawmakers' having mistakenly assigned
the initial entitlement to the lower-valuing party.
In our example of the factory and the neighbors, the market-
facilitating approach would ask which transaction costs are higher: those
of the factory's attempting to purchase the entitlement from the
neighbors, or those of the neighbors' attempting to purchase the
entitlement from the factory. In the first case, the factory may face
significant hold-out problems; in the second case the heighbors may
face significant free-rider problems." Lawmakers who follow the
market-facilitating approach should assign the entitlement to the factory
if they believe that the transaction costs of the hold-out problem are
lower than the transaction costs of the free-rider problem. If they believe
31. Cf Krier & Schwab, supra note 28, at 449 (noting that when it is unclear which party values
entitlement most and transaction costs are asymmetric, efficiency is best served by allocating
entitlement to party that will be able to trade it at lowest cost). A "hold-out problem" exists when a
purchaser must get the consent of a large number of people in order to conclude a transaction. Each
of those who must consent has an incentive to withhold that consent in order to get as large a fraction
of the cooperative surplus from the transaction as possible. A "free-rider problem" exists when it is
costly to a seller to make each of the beneficiaries from a transaction pay a proportionate share of the
benefit.
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the reverse to be the case, they should assign the entitlement to the
neighbors. The market-facilitating approach, because it self-consciously
attempts to encourage private bargaining, implicitly suggests that the
entitlement, once assigned, should be protected by a property rule.
If we take seriously the notion that the rights claimants are risk averse
and, therefore, would receive more utility from capturing half the
cooperative surplus of a Coasean bargain than from having a fifty
percent chance at capturing all the surplus and a fifty percent chance of
capturing none of it, both of these traditional approaches are problematic
because they fail to guarantee a division of the cooperative surplus that is
optimal (or even close to optimal) from a utility-maximization
perspective. The market-mimicking approach is clearly suboptimal from
this perspective because the party initially awarded the entitlement
captures all of the cooperative surplus. The market-facilitating approach
is also suboptimal because, while the parties might divide the
cooperative surplus, the allocation of the entitlement is made without
concern as to whether or not there will be such a division and whether or
not that division would be equitable. If the cooperative surplus is divided
rather than captured by one party, the result is purely happenstance.
To illustrate these different approaches, assume that the neighbors
collectively value clean air at $2000 and that the factory owner values
the right to pollute at $3000. This yields a cooperative surplus of $1000
that the parties might divide. Under a market-mimicking approach, the
law will assign the entitlement to the factory owner, and he captures the
full $1000 surplus.32 Under the market-facilitating approach, the law
might assign the entitlement to either side, depending on which
allocation the lawmakers think will best facilitate bargaining. If this turns
out to result from assigning the entitlement to the neighbors, there will be
a division of the cooperative surplus: the factory owner should pay the
neighbors something more than $2000 but less than $3000 for the right
to pollute. But if it turns out that market-facilitation argues for assigning
the entitlement to the factory owner, the owner will capture all of the
cooperative surplus plus more, just as would occur under a market-
mimicking approach.
32. Actually, the situation is even worse from a distributive perspective. The factory owner gains
the $1000 surplus plus an additional $2000 that, figuratively, comes out of the pocket of the
neighbors. Thus, the factory owner ends the day at +$3000, while the neighbors end the day at
-$2000.
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If we assume that individuals are risk averse and that both sets of
entitlement claimants are equally wealthy (or at least on average all
claimants will be equally wealthy), dividing the cooperative surplus
between the factory owner and the neighbors, rather than awarding it all
to the factory owner or to the neighbors, maximizes social utility. One
way to ensure a division of the cooperative surplus would be to assign
the entitlement in direct contrast to the market-mimicking approach.33
This "market contrarian" approach, as we shall call it, requires
lawmakers to assign the entitlement to the party who values it less, thus
forcing the higher-valuing party to share the cooperative surplus-which
can be created only through a trade-with the lower-valuing party.34
Thus, if the law awards the entitlement to the neighbors, the factory
owner must purchase the entitlement from them. In so doing, the owner
must share at least some of the cooperative surplus with the neighbors.
B. Protecting Entitlements with "Super-Liability" Rules
As described to this point, there are two important problems with the
market-contrarian approach. The practical applicability of this approach
to the assignment of initial entitlements requires that lawmakers know
which party values the entitlement more and what transaction costs each
party faces. The second of these problems is particularly crucial. Suppose
that, applying the market-contrarian approach in our example, lawmakers
determine that the entitlement is worth more to the factory and, therefore,
assign the entitlement to the neighbors. But suppose further that
33. Another way to achieve a division of the cooperative surplus is to divide the entitlement
between the claimants. Ayres and Talley have suggested such a division, although for efficiency
rather than equity reasons. They believe that divided entitlements can reduce strategic behavior in
bargaining that would otherwise preclude efficient transactions. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 Yale
L.J. 235 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J 1027 (1995). But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do
Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 Yale L.J. 221 (1995)
(criticizing Ayres and Talley approach); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow &
Shavell, Property Rules].
34. This approach seems to us to be a property-law equivalent of the argument in favor of penalty
default rules in contract law. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989). A need for a special default rule
arises in the contractual situation in which one of the parties has special losses from the other party's
non-performance. Penalty default rules call for assigning the liability for failing to divulge those
special losses to the party who would suffer them as an inducement for that party to reveal special
information to the other party in the contract formation phase.
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unknown to the lawmakers, the transaction costs of the factory owner's
bargaining with the neighbors to acquire the entitlement are so high as to
prevent a bargain's being concluded. As a result, there will be no bargain
and no division of the cooperative surplus. Moreover, even if the
transaction costs are low, the market-contrarian approach guarantees
some sharing of the cooperative surplus between competing entitlement
claimants, but it fails to guarantee that the surplus be shared equally.
Both of these problems with transaction costs can be overcome by
protecting market-contrarian entitlement allocations with what we call
"super-liability" rules.
An entitlement is protected by a property rule when its holder has an
absolute right to refuse to sell the entitlement at any price. An
entitlement is protected by a liability rule when it can be taken by
another without the consent of the entitlement holder, so long as the taker
pays a court-determined amount of compensation for the taking.
In our example, if the neighbors' entitlement to clean air is protected
with a property right, it is impossible to predict ex ante the precise
division of the cooperative surplus gained by the neighbors' selling their
right to the factory. Under a property-rule regime, either party might
have superior bargaining power (for any number of reasons) that could
enable it to capture the vast majority of the cooperative surplus, leaving
the other with only pennies. In our example, the factory owner might
succeed in paying the neighbors only $2001 dollars, or, at the other
extreme, the neighbors might force a payment of up to $2999. Under a
liability-rule regime, as usually understood, a court would set the
condemnation price at $2000, a figure that would leave the neighbors
indifferent between owning the entitlement and selling it, but that would
permit the factory owner to capture all of the surplus. A traditional
liability rule, then, would be even less desirable than a property rule, so
long as the goal is understood to be an equal division of the surplus.
A superior approach to either a traditional property or liability rule is
to protect the neighbors' entitlement with a liability rule under which the
condemnation price is set to divide the cooperative surplus equally. We
call this a "super-liability" rule. In our hypothetical, for example, a court
could permit the factory to condemn the neighbors' entitlement but set
the condemnation price at $2500 rather than $2000, thus forcing the
factory owner (who would prefer to condemn the entitlement at that
price rather than leave the air clean) to split the cooperative surplus
evenly with the neighbors. Super-liability rules, therefore, can best be
used to promote the underlying goal of market-contrarian entitlement
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allocations-the equal distribution of the cooperative surpluses between
competing entitlement claimants.
We have merely sketched our market contrarian proposal here. There
are many more details that need to be elaborated, but we offer it as a
plausible means of assigning initial entitlements so as to incorporate both
efficiency and equity concerns.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH COMBINING EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
Before determining whether, as Swygert and Yanes propose, the rules
of private law should be designed to consider both efficiency and
equity simultaneously, it is important to understand what is and what is
not the primary competing position. Swygert and Yanes contend that
practitioners of law and economics believe legal policy should single-
mindedly pursue the goal of efficiency.35 Accordingly, their proposal
seeks to reform what is implicitly suggested to be a heartless body of
scholarship that turns a deaf ear to matters of fairness and equity. At best,
this describes the normative position of a fraction of law and economics
scholars; at worst, it is an unfair caricature of the entire law and
economics movement.
The hard question posed by the suggestion of merging equitable
considerations with efficiency considerations in determining legal rules
is not whether legal policy should concern itself with equity, but whether
it makes more sense for private law to focus on maximizing the efficient
use of resources and for the government to redistribute wealth later
through the tax-and-transfer system. As we suggest in this section, we
think that a strong case can be made-one that is not addressed by
Swygert and Yanes-for separating matters of efficiency and equity.
That is, there are good reasons to think a two-step approach to
confronting efficiency and equity concerns is more sensible than the
single-step approach. Our claim here is not conclusive, and it does not
relegate Swygert and Yanes's proposal to the academic dustheap, but it
suggests that their proposal is significantly underdeveloped as it stands
and needs substantial reinforcement and refinement.36
35. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 5, at 255-56 ("[L]aw and economics proponents argue that legal
rules should be applied to produce the most efficient, wealth-maximizing consequences, wholly
apart from empathic considerations about the parties and their relative situations.").
36. We recognize that the criticisms we are about to make might also apply to our market-
contrarian approach.
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A. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
Law and economics relies upon microeconomic theory for its tools of
analysis. One starting place, therefore, in which to seek the roots of law
and economics analysis of income and wealth distributional issues is in
microeconomic theory. The most important tool for our purposes is the
Second Theorem of Welfare Economics. That theorem holds, in essence,
that issues of equity and efficiency are separable.17 That is, different
social policies can independently achieve social goals of equity and
efficiency. Society need not seek to achieve both goals simultaneously
through a single policy. For example, it would violate the Second
Theorem to impose rent controls (i.e., maximum allowable prices
charged to renters of residential properties) as a method of achieving the
distributional goal of making low-income renters better off. Rather,
society should allow relative prices in competitive housing markets to
serve their allocative role of directing resources to their most efficient
uses and then, only after a competitive equilibrium has been reached,
society should implement tax-and-transfer policies to redistribute
resources in line with society's distributive goals.
How might the Second Theorem apply to our concerns about
entitlements and distribution? In our example of the polluting factory and
its neighbors, the Second Theorem directs that the law should structure
rights between factories and neighbors to assure that land is used
efficiently, without consideration of any equitable concerns. The State
can later take from the "winners," whoever they are, and give to the
"losers," thereby satisfying equity concerns. In other words, it is far from
clear that the twin goals of efficiency and equity are best served by
attempting to use legal rules to divide cooperative surpluses created by
individual entitlement and/or individual transactions on the spot.
We are fully aware that many plausible objections may be made to
achieving efficiency first through legal rules, and equity second through
redistributive policies. For example, markets are not really competitive;
consumer preferences may not be convex; production processes may
exhibit increasing returns to scale; tax-and-transfer policies may have an
independent distortionary effect; and other market imperfections might
37. The theorem states that each Pareto-efficient allocation is a market equilibrium. There are
some important technical requirements for the theorem to hold-namely, that consumer preferences
are convex and that production technologies are also convex. See Hal R. Varian, Intermediate
Microeconomics: A Modern Approach 515 (4th ed. 1996). On the separation aspect of the Second
Theorem, see id. at 517-18.
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need correcting before we can confidently assume that a market is
competitive enough to be unregulated. But the important question is not
whether following the dictates of the Second Theorem will lead to
perfect social policy. The question is whether following the Second
Theorem would be superior or inferior to adopting the Swygert and
Yanes approach to dealing with efficiency and equity concerns
simultaneously. In the next section we argue that, due to important
problems that plague Swygert and Yanes's proposal, the results achieved
by following the Second Theorem would likely be superior.
B. Questionable Assumptions and Negative Consequences
There are two reasons to be skeptical that combining efficiency and
equity in the construction of contract law rules (as Swygert and Yanes
have proposed) or in determining initial entitlement allocations (as
we have proposed above) is likely to improve social utility, the
normative measure on which Swygert and Yanes's proposal is implicitly
based. The first reason is that a critical implicit assumption of the
Swygert and Yanes approach-that competing rights claimants are, on
average, equally wealthy ex ante-is almost certainly false. The second
is that taking account of equity in the construction of the rules of private
law would almost certainly have negative efficiency consequences that
would make the dual approach less desirable to individuals located
behind a veil of ignorance than Swygert and Yanes recognize. We will
explain these problems in turn. Finally, we will highlight one further, but
less central, shortcoming of the Swygert and Yanes approach: although it
could be applied to mandatory, or immutable rules of contract law, in
addition to rules of property law, it is not at all applicable to the far larger
set of default rules of contract law.
1. The Equal Wealth Assumption
Suppose that the government had one dollar to allocate and two
potential recipients: one a destitute, homeless person on the verge of
starvation, the other a multi-millionaire. How should the government
determine how to allocate the one dollar? According to Swygert and
Yanes's adaptation of the Rawlsean veil of ignorance, the government
ought to ask how the parties themselves would choose to allocate the
dollar if they knew all the relevant facts except for their future identities.
How the parties would vote in such a situation seems quite clear. They
would almost certainly not divide the cooperative surplus evenly,
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instructing the government to give each claimant fifty cents. They would
allocate the entire dollar to the person on the verge of starvation.
The point of this stark hypothetical is to demonstrate that although
risk aversion does suggest that parties behind a veil of ignorance would
tend to favor an equal distribution of resources, they would favor
equality in the overall distribution of resources, not necessarily in the
distribution of any single resource. If individuals did not know if they
were factory owners or neighbors, would they favor an equal distribution
of the social surplus to be gained by permitting the factory to pollute? If
individuals did not know if they were consumers or retailers, would they
favor an equal distribution of the cooperative surplus to be gained from
an agreement of sale? The answer to both questions is "yes" only if
members of both groups are equally wealthy when the questions are
asked. If neighbors and consumers tend to be poorer than factory owners
and retailers, risk aversion might suggest that individuals behind a veil of
ignorance would favor the majority of the social surplus to be given to
the neighbors and consumers, just as they would favor giving a single
dollar to the starving man rather than to the millionaire. Thus, it seems
more sensible from a utilitarian standpoint to redistribute wealth from
those who are rich on balance to those who are poor on balance, rather
than to try to divide resources equally each time a resource is allocated or
exchanged.
2. Incentive Effects of Equal Divisions
Equal divisions of cooperative surpluses are desirable from a
utilitarian standpoint assuming (1) individuals are risk averse, (2) wealth
is distributed equally, on average, between negotiating parties, and
(3) the equal-division principle does not have unintended side-
consequences that reduce utility. Even if assumptions one and two were
realistic,38 assumption three almost certainly is not. This means that the
normative goal of equally dividing cooperative surpluses is not likely to
maximize social utility in many instances.
The first problem with the strategy of distributing the cooperative
surplus equally between parties is that, where this requires assigning
entitlements in the market-contrarian fashion (to the party who values the
entitlement less), the presence of significant transaction costs will
prevent many efficient distributions from occurring. Even if we limited
38. As explained above, assumption two probably is not realistic.
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market-contrarian allocations to situations in which transaction costs
were expected to be low-thereby ensuring that few if any entitlements
would end up allocated inefficiently-the problem is not solved entirely.
Even when the cooperative surplus exceeds the transaction costs so that
the parties are able to reallocate an inefficient initial allocation of an
entitlement, as the Coase Theorem predicts, any non-zero transaction
costs incurred will reduce the parties' cooperative surplus.
Given a fixed cooperative surplus, risk aversion suggests that society
can maximize its utility by dividing the surplus evenly between two
parties of equal wealth. But if the method that must be used to ensure a
division of the surplus reduces the surplus, it is no longer clear that even
risk-averse individuals will be willing to sacrifice the required amount of
social wealth for the sake of distributive equality. Everything depends on
the individuals' level of risk aversion and how much cooperative surplus
is consumed by transaction costs. Any time that transaction costs are
non-zero (which basically means "always"), it is unclear whether the
equity created by the market-contrarian approach will outweigh, in utility
terms, the transaction costs associated with it.
The second problem with designing legal rules to divide cooperative
surpluses achieved through Coasean bargaining is that such rules may
reduce the incentives of future contracting parties to produce wealth that
can then be allocated through Coasean bargains. If the factory owner
knows that she must share equitably the cooperative surplus to be gained
from starting a factory that pollutes, then this diminishes her incentives
to collect the capital and labor necessary to build and operate such a
factory.39 If the retailer knows that he must share equally with the
consumer the cooperative surplus to be gained from sales, then this
diminishes his incentive to open the store in the first place. The result is
that equal distributions represent a kind of tax on the production of
resources that will dampen incentives to produce and thus result in the
reduction of the total amount of social resources. If the cost of equal
distributions of cooperative surpluses is that less cooperative surplus is
realized through production in the first instance, it again becomes unclear
whether even a risk-averse individual would be willing to suffer the costs
associated with equal distributions of surpluses.
A practical problem also exists with equal division of cooperative
surpluses. Legal decisionmakers would have difficulty determining
39. See Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 33, at 713 (claiming that it is inefficient to
set condemnation payments above point at which payment would make "seller" indifferent).
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accurately the size of the cooperative surplus to be divided. To return to
our nuisance example, if the neighbors' right to clean air is protected by
a super-liability rule, as we proposed, there is a high likelihood that
judges charged with setting the appropriate condemnation price would
err in their calculations.4' It is difficult enough for judges to determine
the damages suffered by a party who owns an entitlement protected by a
liability rule. It would be even more difficult for judges to estimate the
cooperative surplus created when a higher-valuing user of an entitlement
takes the entitlement from a lower-valuing user. Consequently, the error
costs associated with such an endeavor are likely to be very high.
3. Applicability to Contract Law: Immutable Rules and Default Rules
Contract law consist of immutable rules-rules externally imposed on
private parties regardless of the parties' wishes-and default rules-rules
that parties are free to ignore in favor of their mutually agreed upon
rules.4' The prediction that parties are risk averse leads to an analysis of
immutable contract rules that parallels our earlier analysis of rules that
protect entitlement allocations. Recognizing that individuals are risk
averse and assuming that buyers and sellers are, on average, equally
wealthy leads to the plausible suggestion that immutable rules should be
set so as to divide the cooperative surplus achieved through private
contracting between the parties.
Most rules of contract law, however, are default rules that govern the
relationship between contracting parties only if the parties fail to make
other arrangements. For example, consider the rule of commercial
impracticability, which excuses a seller from performance of her
contractual obligation if unforeseen circumstances make performance
"impracticable," so long as the risk was not allocated to the seller by the
contract.42 Notice that this is a default rule, because the parties are free to
contract around the rule if they wish. The Coase Theorem predicts that so
long as transaction costs are low, if the seller is a better insurer of the risk
of unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of either party than is the
40. Cf A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive
and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075, 1079 (1980) (pointing out that assessment costs
might prevent judges from making efficient damages calculations under liability rules); Krier &
Schwab, supra note 28, at 453-54 (reinforcing Polinsky's point).
41. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 34, at 87; see also Symposium, Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 3 S. Cal. J. Interdisc. L. 1 (1993).
42. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1979).
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buyer, the parties will contract for a term that holds the seller strictly
liable for all failures to perform, even when they are unforeseen and
beyond her control. In this situation, the difference in the parties'
abilities to insure against such events is the cooperative surplus that may
be divided based on the parties' relative bargaining ability and leverage.
In the situation of default rules, Swygert and Yanes's theoretical
approach strikes us as impossible to operationalize and, therefore,
ultimately of little value.
Swygert and Yanes's suggestion of how to consider equity and
efficiency in the context of the commercial impracticability default rule,
we infer, would be that the buyer and the seller who find it jointly
advantageous to contract around the commercial impracticability rule
should determine how to split the surplus as if they did not know which
party was the buyer and which was the seller. Whatever might be said in
favor of this equal-division approach in the context of contract default
rules as a matter of theory, it has no normative value in the real world.
Contracting parties by definition know their circumstances, and therefore
they cannot be required to negotiate terms from behind the veil of
ignorance. Although contracting parties on average might be better off if
they were to negotiate terms not knowing whether they were the buyer or
the seller (and thus agreed to split cooperative surpluses), once parties do
know their circumstances, their incentives are to maximize their
individual surpluses. Without an agreement between all contracting
parties to divide cooperative surpluses equally, backed by credible
enforcement mechanisms (obviously an impossibility), rational parties
will seek to claim as much of the cooperative surplus as they can during
bargaining.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have leveled two primary criticisms at Swygert and Yanes's
provocative proposal to integrate efficiency and equity in the
development of private law rules. First, we have accused the authors of a
sin of omission: failing to provide an account of how their theory would
affect rules of entitlement allocation. Because the State is probably better
able to create equity through its awards of entitlements than through
regulating transactions after entitlements have been allocated, this is a
significant omission. We have attempted to remedy this shortcoming by
providing a theory of market-contrarian entitlement allocations. Second,
we have suggested that a legal system concerned with equity as well as
efficiency might do better to create legal rules that maximize efficiency
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and then use the tax-and-transfer system to achieve equity, as the Second
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics suggests. We have
contended that such a two-step approach to legal policy might be
superior to a single-step approach because a two-step approach need not
rely on the unrealistic assumption that all claimants to a given
entitlement are equally wealthy ex ante and need not fear the wealth-
reducing side effects of legal rules that take matters other than efficiency
into account.
As a final note, we wish to point out one controversial assumption
imbedded in Swygert and Yanes's article that goes unchallenged in our
response. When Swygert and Yanes suggest that lawmakers build
concerns for equity into legal policy by adopting the concept of a
Rawlsean veil of ignorance, they implicitly adopt a specific view of what
"equity" means: namely they adopt the utilitarian-based premise that
equal distributions are equitable distributions, given the assumption of
risk aversion. Although we have accepted this view of equity for
purposes of our analysis, it surely will not receive universal acceptance.
We have among us in the legal academy many different ideas about the
content of such lofty ideals as "equity" and "fairness." Consequently,
even if Swygert and Yanes's desire to combine equity with efficiency in
legal policymaking were to gain widespread acceptance, we would still
be far from achieving consensus on a more specific understanding of the
goals of legal policy. We should surely continue to debate how legal
policy can best serve both equity and efficiency, but we should not
expect to reach any clear conclusions.
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